Why Selection and Drift Might be Distinct by Pfeifer, Jessica




Abstract:  In this paper, it is argued that selection and drift might be distinct.  This contradicts recent arguments by Brandon (forthcoming) and Matthen and Ariew (2002) that such a distinction “violates sound probabilistic thinking” (Matthen and Ariew 2002, 62).  While their arguments might be valid under certain assumptions, they overlook a possible way to make sense of the distinction.  Whether this distinction makes sense, I argue, depends on the source of probabilities in natural selection.  In particular, if the probabilities used in defining fitness values are at least partly a result of abstracting from or ignoring certain features of the environment, then selection and drift might in fact be causally distinct.

1.  Introduction
Sober and Millstein have recently been criticized for treating natural selection and random genetic drift as distinct forces or processes.   Matthen and Ariew argue that Sober’s treatment of selection and drift as distinct does not make sense and “violates sound probabilistic thinking” (2002, 62).   Brandon (forthcoming) makes similar arguments in response to Millstein (2002).  However, as I will show, their arguments are valid only if they make certain assumptions about the source of probabilities in natural selection.  I will establish this by considering a commonly held view about the source of probabilities in natural selection—that they are at least partly a result of abstracting from or ignoring certain features of the environment.  I will argue that such a view is reasonable, and, given this view, it is not conceptually confused to treat selection and drift as causally distinct.
2.  Why Such a Distinction Seems Conceptually Confused
Since fitness is defined probabilistically, an organism’s or trait’s actual offspring contribution can vary from that expected based on the organism’s or trait’s fitness.  In its broadest construal, random genetic drift occurs whenever this happens.  To be more precise, “drift is any deviation from the expected result due to sampling error” (Brandon forthcoming).  (I will discuss below a narrower definition of ‘drift’ defended by Millstein and why such a narrower definition might be less desirable.)  Since fitness is defined probabilistically, when an outcome differs from what was expected, it is not due to an additional causal factor--drift.  Exactly the same thing explains the cases where the expected outcome happens and the cases where the actual outcome varies from that expected.
Consider this analogy.  You toss a coin four times.  What would explain the outcome two heads?  Answer:  the physical setup of the coin-tossing trials.  What would explain the outcome four heads?  Answer:  the same thing.  (Matthen and Ariew 2002, 60-61)
Therefore, it does not make sense to treat selection and drift as distinct causal factors. 
This argument alone, however, will not work against Millstein, since she, unlike Sober, restricts the phrase ‘random genetic drift’ to those cases where the organisms or traits involved are selectively neutral and, therefore, natural selection is precluded.  Therefore, there are two types of cases, according to Millstein:  those where the organisms or traits are equally fit (and therefore the sampling is indiscriminate) and those where they are not (and therefore the sampling is discriminate).  When, and only when, they are equally fit does Millstein say that random genetic drift occurs.  When they are not equally fit, then selection becomes the operating causal factor.  In both cases, the actual outcome can vary from the expected outcome; however, ‘random genetic drift’ refers only to cases of sampling error when the organisms or traits are equally fit.  Therefore, Millstein is not guilty of violating “sound probabilistic reasoning.”  Random drift and selection are distinct because they are mutually exclusive; random genetic drift cannot occur when selection is operative, and selection cannot occur when there is random drift.  
The question that arises for Millstein is whether there is good reason to restrict the definition of ‘drift’ in this way.  Brandon argues that there is not.  Not only does such a restriction not fit well with the way many biologists define ‘drift,’ but, more importantly, there is no qualitative difference between the way that the actual outcomes vary from the expected result in the two cases—in the case where organisms are equally fit and in the case where they are not; in both cases, the variation from the expected result is due to sampling error.  This latter argument, though not directed at Millstein, is also developed in Brandon and Carson (1996).
While I think Brandon is correct, this does not entail that we must broaden the definition.  However, given the work that Millstein wants the concept of drift to do—in particular to make sense of the selectionist/neutralist debate—she must accept the broader definition.  For the simplest version of this debate, her definition works perfectly well.  The neutral theory, in its simplest form, asserts that most mutations are either neutral or deleterious.  Selection will act to weed out most deleterious mutations, so that these will rarely have much evolutionary impact.  Therefore, most evolutionary change is due to random genetic drift acting on neutral mutations.  The neutralist still requires the concept of sampling error to be applicable when selection is occurring, but Millstein does not preclude this.  She simply does not call this ‘random drift.’  The neutralist/selectionist debate can then be characterized, as it often is, as a debate about how much of evolution is due to random genetic drift—how often is evolutionary change due to selection and how often is it due to drift.  Since these are mutually exclusive, there is no problem making sense of the debate.  If the neutralist position were really this simple, this would provide some reason for adopting Millstein’s narrower definition.  It would make sense of why the debate is often framed in terms of how much evolution is due to drift.
However, the neutralist position is not (or at least is no longer) so simple.   As Beatty has noted (1984, 200), even Kimura’s strong position has always had some “slack.”  Even in Kimura's 1968 paper, he does not claim that mutations are strictly neutral, but that they are “neutral (or nearly neutral)” (1968, 625).  If this is how the neutralist position is framed, then Millstein’s definition becomes too narrow to be of any help.  In cases of near neutrality, selection is operative, and, therefore, according to Millstein’s definition drift is not occurring.  Consequently, the debate could no longer be framed as a debate about how much of evolution is due to drift rather than selection, since the neutralist would no longer be claiming (according to her definition) that most of evolution is due to drift.  The neutralist would no longer need to make a claim about the prevalence of drift at all, since the neutralist position would still hold even if drift never occurred.  Consequently, statements like the following would not make sense:
Finally, if my chief conclusion is correct, and if the neutral or nearly neutral mutation is being produced in each generation at a much higher rate than has been considered before, then we must recognize the great importance of random genetic drift due to finite population number in forming the genetic structure of biological populations. (Kimura 1968, 626)
If we define ‘drift’ as Millstein suggests, it would make drift effectively irrelevant to the neutralist/selectionist debate.  It is precisely for this reason that Beatty (1984) chooses not to define ‘drift’ in this narrow way.  
If we are interested in making sense of the neutralist/selectionist debate, then the broader definition ought to be used.  And, if the broader definition is correct, it seems from the above argument that treating natural selection and drift as distinct causes (or forces or processes) does not make sense.  However, as I hope to show, sense can be made of the distinction, given certain assumptions about the source of probabilities in natural selection.  This is not to say that Brandon’s or Matthen’s and Ariew’s arguments are incorrect; rather, they overlook a way that one might consistently treat selection and drift as distinct.  Moreover, I am not attempting to show that we ought to hold such a position, but rather that such a position does not, given certain assumptions, “violate sound probabilistic thinking.”  
3.  The Source of Probabilities in Natural Selection
What I hope to show is that, assuming that the probabilities used to define fitness are at least partly a result of ignoring or abstracting away from some features of the environment, it makes sense to treat selection and drift as causally distinct.  The goal of this section is not to argue that we ought to accept this assumption about the source of probabilities in natural selection, but merely to outline some of the reasons one might accept it.  My intent is simply to establish that the assumption is reasonable.  I am primarily interested in what this assumption would imply about the possibility of treating selection and drift as distinct, which I will pursue in the next section.  If it is a reasonable assumption, and if it allows for the possibility of treating selection and drift as causally distinct, then treating them as distinct does not involve a conceptual confusion.
Consider Scriven’s (1959) example of two identical twins, one of whom (Josh) gets struck by lightning before reaching sexual maturity and dies, while the other  (Joe) does not.  Assume that they are phenotypically identical.   Given that fitness is always relative to an environment, how fine-grained ought our description of Josh’s and Joe’s environment be?  Ought we say that Josh and Joe were in different environments—that Josh was in an environment that contained a lightning strike, whereas Joe was not--and that Josh’s fitness in this environment is 0, or close to 0?  If we don’t want to say this, then we must abstract from the lightning strike when describing the environment.  Then we can say that they are in the same environment and that they are equally fit, since they are phenotypically identical; one of them, by “chance,” just happens to do better.
In specifying an organism’s (or trait’s) fitness, we could fill in all the gory details of the environment.  The question that the twins example raises is whether we ought to do so.  There are a number of arguments one can give for ignoring some of the details.  First, it is argued that the use of probabilities in defining fitness does not rely on the assumption that the underlying (or micro) processes are indeterministic.  As Sober argues, “If we assign the two twins identical fitness values, this implies no commitment that their difference in survivorship must be an irreducible matter of chance” (1984, 130).  However, if the world is deterministic, and we filled in all the details, there would be no room left for probabilities in defining fitness.  Moreover, even if the underlying micro-processes were not deterministic and such indeterminism “percolated up” to make fitness probabilistic (as Sober 1984, Brandon and Carson 1996, Stamos 2001, and Glymour 2001 have argued is possible), this would not yield the probabilities of interest to evolutionary biologists.  As Graves, Horan, and Rosenberg have argued, even if probabilities can percolate up, the macro-level processes would “asymptotically approach determinism” (1999, 145).  If so, then all the probabilities used to define an organism’s fitness would be close to 1 or 0.  In addition, if we were to fully describe all the details of the environment, then it is likely that few, if any, individuals would occupy the same environment.  As Sober (1984) and Sterelny and Kitcher (1988) argue, this would prevent biologists from making clear the general patterns in evolution.  Moreover, as Brandon argues (1990), selection requires that the organisms be in the same environment.  Therefore, if few (or no) individuals ever occupied the same environment, then selection would rarely (if ever) occur.  Instead, evolution would primarily be a function of how individuals are distributed across different environments.
	Given these sorts of arguments, it is reasonable (and perhaps correct) to think that the probabilities used in defining fitness values are at least partly a result of ignoring or abstracting from some features of an organism’s or type’s environment.  What remains to be discussed is what precisely this might mean and why this might allow for the possibility of treating selection and drift as causally distinct.  To this I now turn.
4.  Why Selection and Drift Might Be Distinct Causal Factors
What might it mean to ignore or abstract from certain features of the environment?  Let E be the conjunction of environmental factors that are not being ignored or abstracted from and I1 . . . n be those features of the environment that are being ignored.  By ignoring or abstracting from the Is, we can define an organism’s or type’s fitness relative to E, rather than relative to E and some combination of Is.  Suppose there are two environmental factors being abstracted from, I1 & I2.  What we want is to focus on the p(Individual or type has x offspring/E) and not the p(Individual or type has x offspring/E & I1 & I2).  This is formally the position outlined by Sober (1984), though as I will discuss there are various ways we might make sense of it.  However, as Sklar (1970) has argued and Sober acknowledges (1984, 131), in order to get a determinate value for p(Individual or type has x offspring/E), we would need to make it relative to, or conditional on, how the Is are distributed across the population.​[1]​  There are two questions that immediately arise:  first, what does it mean to make the values conditional on how the Is are distributed; second, if we are making the probabilities relative to how the Is are distributed, then are we really ignoring or abstracting from these factors?  The answer to the first question will depend in part on whether we are defining fitness values for individuals or types, and the answer to the second question depends on how we answer the first.  Due to considerations of space, I will focus only on what it might mean in the case of types, since this is in many ways more straightforward.  
What might it mean to make the probabilities relative to the distribution of Is when specifying the fitness values of types?  Commonly, the fitness of a type (phenotype or genotype) is defined as the average expected offspring contribution of individuals of that type.  Since different individuals will have different combinations of phenotypic (or genotypic) properties, either we must fully specify the phenotype, or we could make this average relative to a particular population of individuals or relative to how the other phenotypic properties are distributed.  For example, suppose we were interested in specifying the fitness in moths of having dark wings.  Since dark wings are not the only factor affecting the fitness of the individuals with dark wings, we might fully specify the type as those with dark wings, who fly fast, and so on.  Then we could make this value relative to how the Is are distributed across these types.  Alternatively, we might want to make claims about the fitness of dark wings, without fully specifying the phenotype, since this might in some ways allow for greater generality.  Then we would need to make the value either relative to a particular population or conditional on how the other phenotypic (or genotypic) properties are distributed among the moths with dark wings.  The latter would allow us to abstract from a particular set of individuals and from assumptions about which individuals have which combinations of properties.  I will focus on this last option, since it in many ways allows for the greatest generality.  The points I will make, however, follow for the other versions as well.
What would it mean, then, to make the fitness values relative to how the Is are distributed?  Let P1 . . n be the various other phenotypic (or genotypic) properties.  The fitness of dark moths would be equivalent to the average number of offspring of all dark moths, given E and given how the various combinations of P1 . . n are distributed across the various combinations of I1. . . n.  Now the second question above arises:  Are we really abstracting from or ignoring the Is?  There is a difference between abstracting from how these features are distributed and making the fitness values conditional on how these features are distributed.  If we make the fitness values conditional on how the Is are actually distributed, then anytime the distribution of Is changes, this will count as a change in the environment.  The environment would be defined in part by how these factors are distributed.  The problem is not simply whether we choose to count this as “abstracting from” these factors, but more importantly whether this precludes the very reason we wanted to do so in the first place.  One of the main reasons to abstract from various environmental factors is so that we can make the sorts of generalizations of interest to biologists.  If we make the fitness values conditional on how the features are distributed, then it is unclear to what extent it would be possible to draw the generalizations of interest to biologists.  There would still be facts about a particular population that are abstracted from—in particular which individuals are exposed to which combinations of the Is.  Consequently, there might be more than one population where the various combinations of Is and Ps are distributed in exactly the same way.  However, it would not be very likely, and it certainly would be unlikely that many populations would have the same distribution.  However, we could expand the number of cases covered by making the fitness value relative to a disjunction of distributions.  Since there might be more than one distribution that would yield the same probability, we could make the probabilities relative to the disjunction of all those distributions that yield the same probability value.  What would count as the “same” distribution, then, would be defined by a disjunction of distributions.  Even then, it is not clear that we would get the kind of generality we want.
If making the fitness values conditional on the distribution of Is is not the same as abstracting from or ignoring the Is, then what could the latter mean?  What we really want is to average over different ways the distribution might be.  What we want is to specify what to expect on average if we looked at enough populations.  We can specify this using probabilities rather than specifications of any actual distribution.  We need not assume that this probability represents any indeterminism in the world, nor need it reflect our ignorance.  As Sober has argued, what probabilities allow us to do is carve out generalizations (1984, 127).  What the probability represents is what on average the distribution of ignored factors would be if we looked at enough populations.  This will be a function of the frequency of the various combinations of ignored factors and how these are distributed across various combinations of phenotypic (or genotypic) properties.   How this works and why this yields the conclusion that selection and drift might be causally distinct will become clearer with an example.
Suppose, for example, you want to specify the fitness of dark and light moths in an environment where 60% of the trees are dark and 40% are light.  Assume for simplicity that whenever a dark moth lands on a light tree it is eaten and when a light moth lands on a dark tree it is eaten.  There may be features of the environment (that we are ignoring) that make it deterministic whether a particular moth will land on a particular tree.  Assume, though, that whether a moth lands on any particular tree is not a function of the moth’s color.  (If dark moths were more likely to land on dark trees, then in order to make generalizations covering multiple populations, we ought not ignore this factor.)  Therefore, if we want to make a generalization covering multiple populations about the fitness of wing color, we ought to assume that each moth has an equal chance of landing on any tree.  The probabilities used to specify the dark moths’ fitness in an environment with 60% dark trees would then be relative to the assumption that each moth is equally likely to land on any tree.  By specifying the distribution in this way, we are able to abstract from the way that the moths are actually distributed in any particular population.
However, in order to get a precise specification of the fitness values of dark and light moths, we would also need to weight the various combinations of ignored factors according to their frequency of occurring.  Imagine that there is a feature of the environment that we are abstracting from that occurs frequently and affects the reproductive success of the organisms. Assume that disease on average strikes and kills 40% of moth populations.  This would affect our attributions of fitness values.  Assume, though, that whether an organism contracts the disease is not related to its color.  (If it were, then we ought not ignore disease in specifying the fitness of wing color in moths.)  Therefore, on average we should expect the disease to be equally distributed among dark and light moths.  Consequently, we can assume that on average 40% of both dark and light moths will die of disease.  We can represent this as each moth having a probability of 0.4 of contracting disease.  What we have effectively done is made the fitness values relative, not to the actual distribution of Is, but to what on average this distribution would be if we looked at enough populations, and we specify this using probabilities.  Since disease on average strikes 40% of moths, and since wing color is not linked to whether an organism contracts the disease, we would expect that, if we looked at enough populations, on average, disease would be distributed across approximately 40% of both dark and light moths.  
In any particular population, it may be completely deterministic how the ignored factors are actually distributed, and it may be completely deterministic how the dark and light moths fare, given this distribution.  In any particular population, there may be causes for why the moths don’t land on just any tree and for why disease is not equally distributed in both dark and light moths.  These features cause the actual offspring contribution of dark and light moths to vary from what we would expect on average if we looked at enough populations.  In other words, how the ignored features are actually distributed can cause drift to occur.  They may not cause drift, because the actual distribution may be representative of what we would expect in multiple populations.  Moreover, it is reasonable to think that the larger the population, the more likely it is that the distribution would be close to the average distribution in multiple populations.  These ignored features, however, are not the cause of selection.  The cause of selection for having dark wings is that predators cannot see dark moths on dark trees as well as light moths.  So long as dark and light moths sometimes land on dark trees, there is selection for dark wings.  There would also be selection against dark wings so long as both land on light trees.  There can be selection without any evolution.  Moreover, these selective factors are what make it the case that in a large number of populations with both dark and light moths, when 60% of the trees in the environment are dark, dark moths will on average have greater reproductive success.  It has been argued that selection and drift are caused by the very same factors, but if this analysis is correct then that may not be true.  Drift is caused by the distribution of ignored factors; selection for the trait in question is caused by those features that are not ignored.
5.  Conclusion
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^1	  It might be objected that we could make the fitness values relative to the assumption that none of the ignored factors are present.  However, this would also be a claim about how the ignored factors are distributed.
